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I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCIAL BUILDING
CORPORATION,
PlaintiffAppellant,

Case No. 14499

vs
FRANK S . BLAIR a n d
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND
LCftN ASSOCIATION,

DefendantsRespondents,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

NATURE OF THE CASE
Action by Plaintiff-Appellant, Commercial Building
Corporation, (hereinafter called Commercial) alleging
among other things violation of a provision of a lease
with Defendant-Respondent, Frank S. Blair, by allowing
a building and sign to be located on parking area, and
seeking damages and an order prohibiting the use of
property for* any purpose other than parking, right of
way and driveway.

Blair denied the violation and requested,

among other things, a judgment and decree that the
property not be restricted to parking, right of way and
driveway uses.
-1-
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment,
which were denied.
The trial court found in favor of Blair and
against Commercial, holding that the lease provision
was vague and unclear and finding that the intention
of the parties was that the location of the area for
additional parking, right of way and driveway area was
flexible and could be placed any where on the South
half (approximately) of Blairs1 property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Blair asks the Supreme Court to affirm the judgment
and decree of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1963 Commercial contacted Wallace R. Woodbury
(hereinafter called Woodbury) an attorney and president
of Woodbury Corporation, to have him locate a site
for a new drive-in bank and to cancel an existing lease
Commercial had with principals of Woodbury Corporation.
Woodbury contacted Frank S. Blair and his relatives
and negotiated for a lease on the Blair property.
Woodbury dealt with Commercial and the Blairs as an
-2-
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intermediary.

He represented^both parties.

The Blair property is located at the Northwest
intersection of Harrison Blvd. and 36th Street in Ogden,
being a parcel of land running West of Harrison West
to Brinker and North from the 36th Street to the North
line of Lots 13 and 36 (as extended).

The property is

composed of Lots 13 to 36, Nelson Park Addition, a
vacated alley and lots designated as M and N.
following diagram represents the property:
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An Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Lease Agreement
was prepared by Woodbury dated July 16, 1963.

The parking

arrangement in the Earnest Money was not satisfactory
to the Blairs and they refused to sign a lease with that
provision.
Woodbury continued to negotiate with the parties
and eventually prepared the lease which contains the
following provisions:
"Lessor hereby leases to Lessee and Lessee
hereby leases from Lessor the following
described property in Weber County, State
of Utah, hereinafter sometimes referred to
as the 'Premisesf, to-wit:
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 31 to 36, both
inclusive, together with the East 10.5 feet
of the vacated alley adjacent on the West,
Block 26, Nelson Park Addition in Ogden
City, being part of North half of Sections
3 and 4, Township 5 North, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Subject to joint use with other tenants of
Lessor of parking area, rights of way and
driveways other than drive-in window exits
and approaches;
PARCEL 2: Together with joint use, with
other tenants of Lessor of at least 20,000
square feet of additional parking area,
right of way and driveway area located on
Lots 25"to 30, inclusive of said Block 26,
and upon property adjacent thereto on the
West."
Commercial constructed its drive-in bank on Parcel
1 and the Blairs asphalted in excess of 20,000 square
feet of additional parking and driveway approaches on
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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36th Street.

In about 1973, Blair leased a part of the

Southeast corner of Parcel 2 to American Savings &
Loan, whereupon Commercial commenced this action.
Blair has succeeded to the interest of his relatives and Commercial Building Corporation has succeeded
to the- interest of Commercial Security Bank.

The

structure of American Savings was temporary and has
now been moved.
Blair has continued to provide Commercial with at
least 20,000 square feet of additional parking area,
right of way and driveway area.
POINT

I

-kickick ick

THE LEASE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF MORE
THAN ONE MEANING AND INTERPRETIVE
EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW
THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES
This case requires a construction of the following
phrase in the lease:
"PARCEL 2: Together with joint use with
other tenants of Lessor of at least 20,000
square feet of additional parking area,
right of way and driveway area located on
Lots 25 to 30, inclusive of said Block
26, and upon property adjacent thereto on
West."
-6-
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Commercial claims that the 20,000 square feet of
parking area, right of way and driveway area must
utilize Lots 25 to 30, (19,500 square feet), and then
to make up the balance of 20,000 square feet, land to the
West thereof shall be utilized.

Blair contends that

the 20,000 square feet parking and easement areas may
be located anywhere on the land described as Parcel 2.
On the other hand, both parties agree that it was
intended that Commercial should have right of way and
driveway areas to and from 36th Street and that the
areas on the plat designated as N should be included
in Parcel 2.

The parcel of Lots 25 to 30 and N has

in excess of 20,000 square feet, therefore, there
would be no reason to include in Parcel 2 property
adjacent on the West if the 20,000 square feet was to
be located exclusively on Lots 25 to 30 and N.
Also, from a common sense point of view, this
language could be construed to mean that the area of
parking, right of way and driveway area may be taken
from that land as described, to-wit:

Lots 25 to 30,

and property adjacent thereto on the West; the property
to the West being the vacated alley and Lots 19 to 24;
or from this land plus Lots M and N.
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Being susceptible of more than one meaning, it
was appropriate for the Court to receive interpretive
evidence.
Corbin on Contracts, Volume 3, Section 579:
11
No parole evidence that is offered can be
said to varry or contradict a writing until
by process of interpretation it is determined
what the writing means. The 'parol evidence
rule1 is not, and does not purport to be, a
rule of interpretation or a rule as to the
admission of evidence for the purpose of
interpretation. Even if a written document
has been assented to as the complete and
accurate integration of the terms of a contract, it must still be interpreted; and all
those factors that are of assistance in this
process may be proved by oral testimony.
It is true that the language of some agreements has been believed to be so plain and
clear that the court needs no assistance in
interpreting. Even in these cases, however,
it will be found that the court has had the
aid of parol evidence of the surrounding
circumstances. The meaning to be discovered
and applied is that which each party had reason
to know would be given to the words by the
other party. Antecedent and surrounding
factors that throw light upon this question
may be proved by any kind of relevant evidence.
The more bizarre and unusual an asserted
interpretation is, the more convincing must be
the testimony that supports it. Just when the
court should quit listening to testimony that
white is black and that a dollar is fifty cents
is a matter for sound judicial discretion
and common sense. Even these things may be true
for some purposes. As long as the court is
aware that there may be doubt and ambiguity
and uncertainty in the meaning and application

-8-
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of agreed language, it will welcome testimony as to antecedent agreements, communications, and other factors that may help to
decide the issue. Such testimony does not
vary or contradict the written words; it
determines that which cannot be varied or
contradicted.. .,f
and in footnote 51:
"In Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat. Bank, 154
N.E.2d 683, 15 111.2d 272 (1958), a long,
complex, and fully 'integrated* contract
was executed after prolonged negotiation
and correspondence. It granted to the
plaintiff an option to purchase a majority
of the shares and debentures of a corporation.
It also contained one sentence which, standing
alone, might be supposed to give to the
defendant a power of revocation of the option.
In an excellent opinion, the court held that
extrinsic evidence, covering all the preliminary negotiations, was admissible to show the
intention and purpose of the parties. In the
light of this evidence, the court held that
the single sentence should be given very
limited effect, that the plaintiff's option
was irrevocable, and that he was entitled to
specific performance. The court said: 'In
general, the intention of the parties is to be
determined from the final agreement executed
by them, rather than from preliminary
negotiations and agreements; but previous
agreements, negotiations and circumstances
may be considered in determining the meaning
of specific words and clauses. Similarly,
under well recognized exceptions to the parol
evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is admissible
to show the meaning of words used in a
contract where there is an ambiguity, or when
the language is susceptible of more than one
meaning.' The relevant meaning of all language
always depends upon the entire context, the
surrounding circumstances (necessarily
antecedent and contemporaneous), and the
habits and practices of its users."
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To the same effect is Fayter v. North, et al,
30 Utah 156, 83 Pacific 742;
"...Whenever the terms of a written instrument
are susceptible of more than one interpretation, or a latent ambiguity arises, or the
extent and object of the instrument cannot
be ascertained from the language employed,
parol evidence is admissible to show the sense
which the contracting parties attached to the
terms or language employed in the instrument;
and for this purpose the acts and conversations
of the parties, at or about and subsequent to
the time of the transaction, relating to the
subject matter, constitute proper evidence."...
POINT II
********

THE INTENTION WAS TO ALLOW LESSOR FLEXIBILITY
IN LOCATING AN AREA OF 20,000 SQUARE FEET FOR
PARKING, RIGHT OF WAY AND DRIVEWAY.
Prior to being contacted by Woodbury, the Blairs
had plans to develop their property into a shopping
center project and had three studies made for such
development.

Thereafter there has been two or three

more development plans made by Woodbury who has been
working on layouts the last few years (R110).
The Blairs regarded the Southeast corner as the
most valuable (R79, R139).

Commercial wanted that

corner, but the Blairs were not willing to give it up
and Commercial settled for a parcel to the North
(Parcel 1) (R113).
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After negotiating between the parties, Woodbury
prepared an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Lease
(dated July 16, 1963), which provides for Commercial
to lease from Blairs property at:

' ;v

"Approx. 3571 Harrison Blvd. (150* on
Harrison to 140' depth at NE corner of
Blair land)...Landlord to provide
additional parking not less than 150* x
140' adjacent on South to above parcel...11
(Exhibit H) (21,000 square feet)
The contingencies in the Earnest Money were not
met and either party could have cancelled (R133).

The

parking arrangement in the Earnest Money was not
satisfactory to the Blairs and they refused to sign
a lease with that provision (R131,141,146).
Woodbury continued his negotiations between the
parties and then prepared the lease (signed in May
of 1964) (Exhibit C) (R110), which contains the
following provisions:
"Lessor hereby leases to Lessee and Lessee
hereby leases from Lessor the following
described property in Weber County, State
of Utah, hereinafter sometimes referred to
as the 'Premises1, to-wit:
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 31 to 36, both
inclusive, together with the East 10.5 feet
of the vacated alley adjacent on the West,
Block 26, Nelson Park Addition in Qgden
City.
Subject to joint use with other tenants of
Lessor of parking area, rights of way and
driveways other than drive-in window exits
and approaches.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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PARCEL 2: Together with.joint use with
other tenants of Lessor of at least 20,000
square feet of additional parking area,
right of way and driveway area located on
Lots 25 to 30, inclusive of said Block 26,
and upon property adjacent thereto on West."
This language evidences an intention of Lessor to
develop the property and have other tenants with joint
uses of parking, right of way and driveway.
Parcel 1 was adequate for Commercial's parking
needs (R131), but it desired ingress and egress to
and from 36th Street as well as Harrison (R114,131),
and additional parking area reserved so that the
Blairs wouldn't build on all of the remaining property.
(R114,131) .
Woodbury prepared the description for Parcel 2,
and sought to describe it in such a manner that it
went to 36th Street and included the Blair property
West of Lots 25 to 30 (R130,144,145)
Since the Blairs would not sign the lease with
the Earnest Money language regarding the additional
parking, (150' x 140' South of Parcel 1 ) , the
compromise language was worked out after a long
period of negotiations (R131).

The Blairs did not

intend to reserve the Southeast corner for parking
and this intent was discussed with Commercial (R135).

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Referring to this corner t Woodbury testified:
"I'm sure, Mr. Campbell, there was a discussion
from the beginning with the bank. First, they
(wanted) their own building there. After that,
they didn't want to be obstructed. But it's
my recollection that when the Blairs wouldn't
go along and they knew that I was going to try
to develop the rest, and that I was adamant
about not having buildings on the corner, it's
my recollection that they decided to take their
chances and go and that they expected hopefully
that nothing would ever interfere, and in any
case (certainly) a goodly portion of it had to
be reserved for parking."
The lease at paragraph 5 provided:
"Lessor shall install asphalt surfacing and
paint parking lines over portions of the
entire premises designated as parking and
drive areas, and Lessee shall pay Lessor a
pro-rata share of the cost such that Lessee
ultimately pays the surfacing and lining costs
of the Parcel 1, plus approaches thereto over
public property to the East of Parcel 1.
Lessor shall complete surfacing of Parcel
1 and Parcel 2 at or near the same time, such
that the entire area will be available for use
at substantially the same time."
The driveway approach on 36th Street presumably
was located as required by the City, to the West of
Harrison so as to not interfere with traffic and
lined up with an extension of the vacated alley portion
of Parcel 1.

In excess of 20,000 square feet of

additional parking area was asphalted at the time of

-13-
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construction of the bank facility as required hy the
lease and as a matter of convenience for the Blairs
at that time was located in the Southeast area of
their property, extending to 36th Street, covering
Lots 25 to 30 # the lot marked N and half of the
vacated alley on the West (R83).
At this time # the Blairs had not settled on a plan
for the development of the remainder of their property
and the permanent location of the additional parking
area was not then, nor has it now been finally fixed.
In 1965, Blair was contacted by a gasoline
company about leasing a part of the Southeast corner,
resulting in Commercial contacting Blair by letter
(Exhibit E) stating that the Southeast corner was
reserved for parking.

Blair responded verbally and

stated his understanding of the lease provision
(R89) and again with regard to Commercial's letter on
American Savings (Exhibit F ) , Blair responded
verbally stating he was under no obligation by law
to discuss development plans with the bank (R94).
Blair has maintained from the beginning that
there was continuing flexibility in the location of

-14-
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the additional easement areas,so as to be compatible
with the expected building development on the remainder of the property.

A position Commercial was well

aware of prior to signing the lease and a position
Commercial accepted.
POINT III
•kJck-k-k * * * *

THE COURTS FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
The Blairs have on going plans to develop their
property and acquire tenants.

Presumptively because

of set back and side yard requirements, if a building were
located on the southeast corner, not all of the land
area would be covered by the structure.

Nonetheless,

Lots 25 to 30 were not committed exclusively for
parking.

The Blairs desired flexibility,

Until they

knew how their remaining land was to be developed,
they were not willing to commit the southeast corner
or any specific part for parking (R149,169).
Commercial knew of this prior to signing the
lease and took its chances.

Woodbury sought to place

this intent and understanding in the lease.
-15-
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CONCLUSION
It appears that there is ample evidence in the
record to establish that Parcel 2 covers the south
half of the Blair parcel over to 36th Street; that
the Blairs desired flexibility in the location of the
20,000 square feet on Parcel 2 and until their land
was developed they were not willing to finally commit
any specific portion to parking and easements; that
Commercial knew of these positions and was willing to
take its chances; and that Woodbury sought to incorporate these concepts into the lease.
The judgment and decree of the trial Court ought
to be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,

LA VAR E. STARK
Attorney for DefendantRespondent Blair
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